The language of "resilience" features prominently in contemporary climate security debates. While a basic definition of resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb recurrent disturbances so as to retain its essential structures, processes, and feedbacks, I argue that resilience is currently articulated in four distinct ways in climate security discourse. These are strategic resilience, neoliberal resilience, social resilience, and ecological resilience. Most analyses of resilience-based security discourses have hitherto been informed by Foucauldian notions of governing populations at a distance to ensure compliance with neoliberal norms. However, in the climate security field, neoliberal resilience discourses have achieved relatively little salience, while Foucauldian accounts are largely overdetermined, thus obscuring the multiple ways in which resilience is currently articulated. In this article, I identify these disparate resilience discourses through an analysis of recent US and UK government, international organization, nongovernmental organization, and academic climate security literature. I then analyze these discourses in terms of their basic discursive structure and degree of institutionalization to clarify how dominant climate security narratives construct understandings of security and insecurity in contemporary global environmental politics. While strategic articulations are currently most conspicuous, I argue that only social and ecological resilience support long-term human flourishing and ecosystem integrity.
acting as a "threat multiplier" (Center for Climate and Security 2015), there is general consensus that climate change has the potential to increase the vulnerability of individuals, communities and states, and the stability of the entire international system. One frequently touted remedy for these insecurities is resilience, which some argue has lately replaced both stability as the predominant trope within security discourses (Zebrowski 2016) and sustainable development as the focus of social-ecological discourses (Frankenberger et al. 2014) .
The genealogy of resilience as a security value can be traced to British emergency governance in the interwar years and to fostering preparedness for thermonuclear war in the immediate postwar period. However, it was not until the early 1970s that the concept was consolidated into an emergent form of security governance (Zebrowski 2016) . Since then, resilience has appeared in many fields, including engineering, ecology, computing, psychology, and economics, to denote "the capacity of an entity or system to withstand shocks, recover, adapt, or in some cases learn, evolve, or move to a new systemic equilibrium while maintaining basic functions" (Corry 2014, 257) . However, beyond this general characterization, resilience is articulated in a multiplicity of ways, both across distinct issue areas and even within specific fields, as has occurred vis-à-vis climate security (Boas and Rothe 2016; Brown 2013; Walker and Cooper 2011; Zebrowski 2016, 148) .
While some welcome resilience's conceptual vagueness for its potential to integrate diverse actors and understandings toward commonly agreed security objectives (Zebrowski 2016), others warn that "resilience" has become an illdefined boundary object liable to be co-opted by widely divergent interests, actors, and contexts (Gillard 2016; Joseph 2013) . In this article, I clarify the disparate meanings of resilience within contemporary climate security discourses to better understand how these tropes construct conceptualizations of security and insecurity. By extending upon previous surveys of the field, which have hitherto underexamined the emergence of resilience-inflected climate security discourses (see, e.g., Dalby 2013; Eckersley 2009; Elliott 2015; Floyd and Matthew 2013; Hayes and Knox-Hayes 2014; McDonald 2013; Trombetta 2008) , my analysis deepens understandings of how dominant climate security narratives shape perceptions of climatic risks, responsibility for harm and remediation, and the basic contours of discursive power in contemporary global environmental politics.
In security studies, resilience is most readily analyzed in terms of its role "in reproducing and disseminating neoliberalism … [by] controlling 'life' or populations" (Corry 2014, 258 ; see also Grove 2012; Joseph 2013; Walker and Cooper 2011; Welsh 2014; Zebrowski 2016) . From this Foucauldian perspective, power is understood to be exercised not directly by means of coercion, but through the governing of populations via economistic regimes of knowledge. However, although these models are instructive, in climate security discourse, they obscure other possible articulations of resilience, including within non-neoliberal forms of governmentality and/or as a means to subvert traditional realist security logics (Corry 2014) . It is necessary, therefore, to place the standard Foucauldian account in the context of other key existing/emergent articulations of resilience, with specific reference to contemporary climate security discourses. In the climate security field, neoliberal articulations of resilience coexist with strategic, social, and ecological frames. By drawing on case study material from the United States, Britain, key international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and relevant academic literature, I outline these four discourses in this article.
This analysis is distinguished from several previous studies of resilience discourse, including Methmann and Oels (2015, 54) , who extend Holling's (1973) typology of "engineering resilience" (resilience as system maintenance) and "ecological resilience" (resilience as system adaptation) to include "socioecological resilience," in which emergent systems "manage themselves and even develop new and improved properties." Another approach is provided by Welsh (2014) , who distinguishes between "psycho-social resilience" (the resilience of individuals and communities), "socioecological resilience" (the capacity of a system to return to a state of equilibrium), and resilience as neoliberal governmentality. Meanwhile, Cavelty et al. (2015) classify resilience discourses in terms of their temporalities (whether the discourse relates to past or potential future disruptive events) and how the discourse distributes responsibilities and risks. Finally, Bourbeau (2013) identifies three distinct forms of resilience: "resilience as maintenance" (adaptation to maintain the status quo), "resilience as marginality" (reforms at the margins but not fundamental policy changes), and "resilience as renewal" (changes to fundamental policy assumptions and even the transformation of underlying social structures).
In the first section of this article, I develop a framework for identifying, categorizing, and comparing resilience discourses in terms of their respective referent objects, securitizing actors, nodal points, forms and rationalities of governance, social-ecological-technological transitional pathways, level of formal authority, and degree of institutionalization. Using this framework, I then elucidate the four main resilience discourses within contemporary climate security debates and evaluate their political salience. I conclude by reflecting on the limits of discourse analysis in climate security studies, and I identify future opportunities for improving understandings of actually existing resilience practices.
Climate Security and Resilience: A Framework for Analysis
While many of the existing taxonomic schemes noted above are instructive, the typology I develop in this article differs from these in three key ways. First, it is concerned specifically with resilience as it is articulated within climate security discourse. This necessitated a close reading of key texts articulating "the climate" as an object of security discourse and "resilience" as a security strategy to reduce vulnerability to climatic risks. My objective was to identify the set of basic discourses that delineate the key understandings and representations that structure agreement and disagreement within the climate security debate rather than merely to determine the most frequently articulated discourses, or those discourses enunciated by the most powerful actors. For this reason, neither the number of texts consulted nor the number of discourses identified was predetermined (Hansen 2006) . The texts selected were all published since 2007, which is widely understood as the year in which climate security discourse first attained salience (Dalby 2013; McDonald 2013; Oels 2012; Trombetta 2008) .
Following Hansen (2006) , the chosen texts also exhibit one or more of the following characteristics: they clearly articulate a referent object and related identities and policy responses, are generated at a "high level" with the formal authority to define a political position, and/or are widely read and attended to, thereby signaling a reasonable degree of political significance. I rated the level of formal authority of each group of texts on a spectrum of very high, high, moderate, low, and very low, based on whether the texts were produced by states, international institutions, international NGOs, and academics/activists, respectively. The same scale was used to measure the level of attention received by each body of texts, using the number of records returned from searches of the Factiva database as a proxy. These results are presented in full in the Appendix. Records of 400 or greater were ranked as very high, 300-399 as high, 200-299 as moderate, 100-199 as low, and 99 or less as very low. While it is impossible simply to equate the level of attention a discourse receives with the political power it possesses, it may often be the case that citizens do adopt whichever tropes they hear most frequently and/or most recently (Druckman 1999) . More fundamentally, the prominence of a discourse reflects the extent to which it has achieved institutionalization, whereby rules, norms, and ideas become unquestioned and/or simply "common sense" (Korkut et al. 2016) , which in many ways is "the ultimate act of political power" (Smith 1996, 13) .
The second analytical innovation I make is to categorize resilience discourses in the first instance in terms of the referent object or objects of security they articulate. While identifying referent objects is commonly used in security studies, previous categorizations of resilience discourse have more frequently focused on modes of governmentality or temporalities (e.g., Cavelty et al. 2015; Welsh 2014) . The referent object/s of a particular security discourse are those entities 'that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival' (Buzan et al. 1998, 36) . Traditionally, the referents of security have been understood as largely singular, static, and/or homogenous entities, such as "the state" or "the nation" (Oels 2012; Trombetta 2011) . However, this singularity is untenable in the context of the increasingly interconnected, unpredictable, and uncontrollable Earth system occasioned by the Anthropocene (Grove and Chandler 2017) , which is the new geological epoch into which the Earth has entered as a consequence of humans immeasurably changing global geochemical processes since the middle of last century (Steffen et al. 2015) . For, as Harrington and Shearing (2017, 111 ; see also Fagan, 2017; McDonald 2018 ) point out, "holding any object or level to be the singular object of security misrepresents the layered folds of existence in the Anthropocene, … [and] fundamentally misreads how creative, 'intra-acting' forces constitute our worlds." This also underlines the futility of distinguishing referent objects from the biogeochemical processes through which they are constituted. Therefore, to retain its utility as a category of analysis, the referent/s of security must be understood not simply as discrete entities, such as states and communities, but as potentially systemic in the sense of "socioecological systems" or "ecosystems," for example. Analyzing resilience discourses as to whether they conceive of the referent/s of security as systemic or merely discrete is the third key analytical innovation of this article.
Five further elements are required to analyze the articulation of resilience within climate security discourses. First, both threats and referent objects are articulated by securitizing actors, such as political leaders, governments, international organizations, bureaucracies, lobbyists, activists, and communities. Generally, these actors do not depict themselves as the referent objects of security discourse; rather, they emphasize the need to defend the security of the state, nation, civilization, environment, or some other existentially threatened entity (Buzan et al. 1998) .
Second, all discourses are constructed from a set of key rhetorical devices or nodal points, which are the privileged or dominant forms of speech that fix the meaning of a particular discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 2001) . For example, in realist parlance, the description of the international system as "anarchical" is a nodal point that articulates a Hobbesian world order. Similarly, the notion of a "rules-based system" is a nodal point in neoliberal institutionalism, which implies that states can profitably cooperate toward common objectives.
Third, security discourses display different forms of governance that organize governing structures, of which Kronsell and Bäckstrand (2010) identify three basic types: "hierarchies," "markets," and "networks." Hierarchical forms of governance operate through administrative orders and rules, which are developed and implemented by governments and bureaucracies; markets function as a form of ostensibly self-organizing economic governance; while networks are resource, economic, political, informational, and interpersonal dependencies built on communication, trust, and cooperation.
Fourth are the rationalities of governance that shape actors' behavior and expectations. Again, Kronsell and Bäckstrand (2010) identify three distinct approaches: "administrative," "market," and "deliberative." In an administrative framework, bureaucrats and experts work to solve complex problems and implement solutions through laws and regulations, whereas market rationality relies on price mechanisms, contracts, and the assumption of economically rational actor behavior. Deliberative rationality, meanwhile, opens decision-making processes to those individuals and groups most impacted by particular issue areas and seeks policy solutions that all affected parties can accept.
Finally, all resilience discourses articulate a particular social-ecologicaltechnological transitional pathway in response to global environmental and socioeconomic change (Leach et al. 2010 ). While the range of possible positions on this question is vast, in contemporary climate security discourse, the most prominent perspectives can be captured by a broad juxtaposition between ecomodernist discourses at the most technologically optimistic end of the spectrum and postgrowth/postdevelopment perspectives at the most technologically skeptical (Grunwald 2018) . Ecomodernists envisage the "radical decoupling of humans from nature" (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015, 18) via urban, industrial, and agricultural intensification and high-energy technologies. Economic growth and technological innovation are assumed to face no biophysical limits, and all environmental and social problems are believed to be technologically resolvable without generating any significant unintended consequences. Postgrowth/postdevelopment transitional pathways, in contrast, reject the assertion that technology can solve most ecological problems and that economic growth faces no biophysical limits. Instead of growing the world into prosperity, reductions in consumption in the Global North are proposed to ensure that the social and ecological costs of economic activity do not exceed its benefits and to create ecological space for improved living standards in the South (Ferguson 2015; Isenhour 2016) . Whereas ecomodernism prescribes technocratic forms of governance, postgrowth/postdevelopment discourses facilitate participatory/deliberative policy-making processes (Cosme et al. 2017 ) that challenge dominant neoliberal development models (Escobar 2012) .
Four Discourses of Resilience
In the remainder of this article, I use this analytical framework to outline the four main articulations of resilience in contemporary climate security discourse in terms of their respective referent objects, securitizing actors, nodal points, forms and rationalities of governance, and social-ecological-technological transitional pathways. I also evaluate each discourse as to the clarity of its referent object/s, level of formal authority, and degree of institutionalization.
Strategic Resilience
Mainstream security actors have adopted a largely traditional national security framing of resilience, involving military responses to natural disasters, relating climatic risks to security planning and critical infrastructure protection, and resisting significant geopolitical rebalancing (Brown 2013 ). This exhibits a narrowly strategic understanding of resilience, which is articulated in key national and climate security strategies released by the US Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security (DHS), the White House, the UK Ministry of Defence, and relevant reports from defense think tanks.
In the United States, strategic resilience was first articulated following the formation of the DHS in 2002. The department's National Strategy for Homeland Security declared that [We] must now focus on the resilience of the system as a whole-an approach that centres on investments that make the system better able to absorb the impact of an event without losing the capacity to function. While this might include the building of redundant assets, resilience often is attained through the dispersal of key functions across multiple service providers and flexible supply chains and related systems. Resilience also includes the protection and physical survivability of key national assets and structures (US Department of Homeland Security 2007, 28).
While the 2007 strategy did not explicitly acknowledge climate security risks, it precipitated the subsequent adoption of resilience language into the climate risk and threat analysis frameworks of key US security agencies, leading to the "mainstreaming" of climate change as an issue of strategic importance (Thomas 2013) . A catalyst for this securitization of climate change was President Obama's (2009) Executive Order 13514, which requires all federal departments, including the DoD, to reduce operational and nonoperational greenhouse gas emissions by 34 percent from 2008 levels by 2020, evaluate risks posed by climate change, produce an annual environmental sustainability plan, and develop a climate change adaptation strategy. Climate security considerations also featured prominently in the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies (Obama 2010 (Obama , 2015 and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, which proposed a range of "actions to increase energy and water security, including investments in energy efficiency, new technologies, and renewable energy sources, [to] (Obama 2013) . Since 2012, the DoD (2012, 2014a) has also published two Climate Change Adaptation Roadmaps. The 2014 Roadmap calls "for sustainable use of natural resources to support mission needs, meet stewardship requirements, and contribute to ecosystem resilience in the face of climate change" (12) and requires defense agencies to "contribute to coordinated inter-agency efforts to support climate preparedness and resilience at all levels of government" (15).
Climate change considerations and the language of resilience have also been incorporated into recent security strategy documents in the United Kingdom (see, e.g., Strategic Trends Programme 2014; UK Ministry of Defence 2008 Defence , 2010 . Contrary to the largely pre-emptive American articulations of resilience, British discourse exhibits a more precautionary approach, which shifts security framings from traditional friend-enemy binaries to a risk prevention and management logic, emphasizing complexity, preparedness, and decentralization (Boas and Rothe 2016; Walker and Cooper 2011) . For instance, the Home Office (cited in Zebrowski 2016, 107) defines resilience as the ability "at every relevant level to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges." Similarly, the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review promised to "increase … finance for developing countries … to reduce emissions, increase access to energy, [and] build resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable people" (UK Ministry of Defence 2015, 70). While the UK military has not adopted emissions reductions targets and energy efficiency measures comparable to those the United States has implemented, Britain's overall climate security strategy is better integrated into its national climate policy framework. This is reflected in the United Kingdom's commitment to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent by 2025 from 1990 levels, compared to the US commitment of a 26-28 percent cut by 2025 from 2005 levels (UK Committee on Climate Change 2017; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2016), which the Trump (2017) administration does not intend to honor. The United Kingdom has also been a persistent proponent of strong emissions reductions within international climate negotiations and has attempted to securitize climate change to stimulate multilateral action to reduce emissions, including instigating the first ever debate on climate change in the United Nations Security Council in 2007 (Harris 2012) .
Despite these differences of emphasis, by adopting the state as their primary referent object and the maintenance of the geopolitical status quo as the overall security objective, both the US and UK resilience discourses sit comfortably within traditional national security frameworks. The main securitizing actors are national military establishments and senior defense policy makers, thereby according strategic resilience a very high level of formal authority. Strategic resilience has also attained a very high degree of institutionalization, with many of the discourse's key texts being very highly read and attended to. A clear and discrete referent object, the nation-state, is articulated, as are a set of nodal points, such as "whole of government" strategies to secure "critical infrastructure," which equate climate adaptation with maintaining operational resilience in the face of existential threats.
Although some attention is paid to information networks, strategic resilience is primarily shaped by hierarchical forms of governance and administrative rationality, while the envisaged social-ecological-technological transitional pathway is a technocratic form of ecomodernism. Although this recognizes the enormity of global environmental problems, mitigating these risks is assumed to be a technological and administrative challenge best addressed by state security operatives and bureaucracies rather than a broader re-evaluation of socioeconomic and strategic objectives. The fundamental purpose of strategic resilience, therefore, is to uphold traditional national security values, such as absolute sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of increasingly nontraditional threats emanating from nonstate actors and global environmental and demographic change.
Neoliberal Resilience
When the focus is shifted from traditional strategic security discourses to the governing of populations in the name of security, the referent object of resilience discourse also changes. From this perspective, the security of critical infrastructure and systems is not to be found merely in the resilience of these systems in and of themselves, or even in the territorial defense of the nation-state, but in the resilience of individual human beings and communities. In theory, resilience as governmentality could serve various security objectives (Dean 2009 ). However, in practice, it has most readily shaped patterns of thought and behavior that sustain neoliberal socioeconomic norms and structures. Importantly, this is not necessarily in order to protect individuals and communities directly from harm but to preserve the conditions for the perpetuation of neoliberal capitalism by constructing citizen-subjects as "entrepreneurs and consumers" who are "adapted to the inherent insecurities of market life" (Corry 2014, 259) .
While the publics of Western nations are frequently governed in this manner, the articulation of neoliberal resilience in climate security discourse has most readily been directed toward vulnerable states and their citizens, where it has sought to imbue subjects with the requisite characteristics to be resilient in the face of global socioeconomic and climatic instability (Grove and Chandler 2017; Joseph 2013) . For both vulnerable states and individuals, resilience is articulated as indispensable for survival in volatile global market and climatic systems (Joseph 2013; Walker and Cooper 2011) , where the state takes little responsibility for the life chances of its citizens, irrespective of how these are circumscribed by limited educational opportunities, poor health, or prevailing socioeconomic structures (Brown 2005; Dean 2009 ). In this way, resilience, as Zebrowski (2016, 3) observes, "offer[s] a way out of the age-old liberal problematic which pits freedom against security … by … harness[ing] the inherent resilience of vital systems to self-organise responses in a bottom-up fashion, rather than impos[ing] order in a top-down fashion." This is in contrast to strategic resilience, which pursues security hierarchically by attempting to mitigate direct threats to its referent.
The main neoliberal securitizing actors are international financial and development institutions, led by the World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Resources Institute, which over the last four decades have been prime conduits of the neoliberal Washington consensus (Babb and Kentikelenis 2017; Bernstein 2001) . In the climate security field, much of this literature is built around the concept of "climate-resilient development," which the World Bank (2013) defines as a "set of institutional arrangements, processes and instruments that help identify the risks from disasters, climate extremes, gradual long-term climatic changes, and their associated impacts, and the design of measures" (viii) to "help the poor become more resilient" (3).
One recommended means to make the poor more resilient is the "scaling up" of ecosystem-based enterprises to increase productivity ( World Resources Institute 2008), which may increase resilience if ecosystems are not further compromised and vulnerability is not exacerbated by economic restructuring. However, expanding ecosystem-based enterprises might also leave communities more vulnerable through greater exposure to global commodity and financial markets and/or ecosystem degradation (Adger 2000; Dalby 2013 ). Another neoliberal resilience strategy is the sharing of data and establishing networks to assist in planning for environmental disasters (World Bank 2013). Again, if these networks assist vulnerable entities to build capacity to deal with risks, then, all else being equal, vulnerability should be reduced. However, imploring vulnerable states, communities, and households to be resilient in the face of risks they did not produce and have limited capacity to manage or ameliorate is characteristic of broader patterns of neoliberal risk distribution, which increase the exposure of the most vulnerable while enhancing the adaptive capacity of the most privileged (Joseph 2013; Welsh 2014; Zebrowski 2016) .
The main risk mitigation stratagem of neoliberal resilience is "financialization," involving the transformation of environmental insecurities into financial instruments, such as insurance, weather derivatives, and catastrophe bonds to hedge against environmental disasters (United Nations Environment Programme 2014; World Bank 2013). If these instruments increase the ability of individuals and communities to manage risks and recover from disasters, then they may alleviate vulnerability. The problem is, however, that these measures are often not accessible to the most vulnerable people, who are generally too poor to purchase simple insurance, let alone more sophisticated financial instruments (Dalby 2013) .
Financialization, therefore, constitutes the privatization of responsibility for managing and ameliorating risk rather than decisive action to reduce existing or future risks for vulnerable populations (Corry 2014; Grove 2012) . This is characteristic of economic forms and rationalities of governance that utilize markets and information networks to instill neoliberal modes of resilience in vulnerable states, communities, and individuals, in both inducing and punitive ways. An example of the former is the World Bank's (2013, 12) call for incentives "to progressively reward countries and communities that take positive action towards climate and disaster resilient development." Concessional loans for infrastructure improvements, implementation of prescribed disaster response systems, and access to insurance are examples of such inducements. The World Bank (2013) also admonishes governments to "allow institutional structures to mature and transcend political cycles" (15) and to reorganize bureaucracies "to shield programmes from political change" (16). Depoliticization and bureaucratic reorganization are well-trodden methods of embedding neoliberal rationalities into state structures and policy outcomes (Brown 2005 ). However, resilience discourses intensify this dynamic by applying ecological motifs of complex adaptive systems, which depict the neoliberal order as "natural" and immutable, thereby neutralizing critical inquiry into its consequences (Brown 2012; MacKinnon and Derickson 2013; Walker and Cooper 2011) . Punitively, the World Bank's (2013, 31) lending criteria have become increasingly conditional on recipient countries implementing prescribed resilience measures, so that to receive assistance in the wake of natural disasters, borrowers must demonstrate "that they have engaged in a comprehensive disaster management program" and that they are sufficiently insured.
Although neoliberal resilience enjoys a high level of formal authority, it is significantly less resonant than strategic or even ecological articulations in the wider climate security discourse, achieving only a very low level of attention and institutionalization. This may be because its referent object is generally less clearly articulated than in other resilience discourses. For while neoliberal resilience might appear to be concerned about vulnerable states and their citizens, it is actually "development itself-the process of wealth generation-which is being made more resilient to the impacts of climate change" (Brown 2012, 45) . Consequently, several analysts have argued that neoliberal articulations of resilience are primarily concerned with protecting "business as usual," "defending the status quo," opening "a new profit frontier" in climate change adaptation, and prescribing a mechanism to facilitate continued economic growth (Brown 2012; Welsh 2014) . Indeed, these ecomodernist assumptions and objectives are made explicit by the World Bank (2013), which warns that "weather-related events … can slam the brakes on economic growth and cripple markets" (v) and that "economic growth is necessary to reduce poverty and is at the heart of increasing resilience to climate change in poor countries" (7).
The key nodal points in neoliberal resilience discourse are "climate-resilient development," "risk management," and "individual responsibility." Although the discourse is avidly ecomodernist in its envisaged social-ecological-technological transitional pathway, it is less technocratic than strategic resilience and adopts an economic rationality of governance that supports market-led processes of technological development and risk management. Overall, the basic purpose of neoliberal resilience discourse is the preservation of the global neoliberal system through the inculcation of vulnerable states and their citizens to mitigate their vulnerability through market processes, while making few claims on the resources of more privileged entities, such as wealthy countries and transnational corporations. Although, at a discrete level, vulnerable states and communities are the primary referents of the discourse, it is actually the neoliberal socioeconomic status quo that constitutes the fundamental, systemic referent of the discourse.
Social Resilience
The third articulation of resilience found in climate security discourse is social resilience. Outside of academia, the main securitizing actors of this discourse comprise a small number of intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, including some United Nations agencies and Oxfam, and social movements such as the Transition Towns and voluntary simplicity/degrowth movements.
Social resilience is commonly defined as "the ability of communities to withstand external shocks to their social infrastructure" (Adger 2000, 361) . It therefore adopts communities as its referent object and is strongly correlated with the collective "capacity" and "agency" of communities to alleviate fundamental vulnerabilities stemming from resource dependency and global environmental, social, and economic change (Adger 2000; Brown 2013) . Although, in the neoliberal era, the state has significantly abdicated responsibility for alleviating vulnerability to individuals and communities via resilience discourses, resilience does have the capacity to enhance individual and community autonomy. This emergent "postdevelopment" (Escobar 2012) or "postliberal resilience" paradigm "puts the agency of those most in need of assistance at [its] centre, stressing a programme of empowerment and capacity building" (Chandler 2012, 216) .
Social resilience eschews strategic rationality and metaphors of conflict and violence by adopting a human security framework (Brown 2013) , which prioritizes the security needs of people and communities, first and foremost "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" (United Nations Development Programme 1994). Moreover, when human security is understood in terms of resilience, security stems less from merely stabilizing systems to enhancing the capacity for system transformation. Transformation is more far-reaching than mere adaptation (Brown 2013) , because whereas adaptability refers to the ability to build resilience through collective action, "transformability is the capacity of people to create a fundamentally new social-ecological system when ecological, political, social, or economic conditions make the existing system untenable" (Folke 2006, 260) .
Social resilience is characterized by the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability's (2012, 6) Resilient People, Resilient Planet report as "the scaling up [of] humanitarian capacities to deal with increasing environmental stress and potential shocks, … [involving] precautionary strategies to prevent adverse impacts on social and natural systems." Meanwhile, a NGO exemplar of social resilience is Oxfam's (2009) People-Centred Resilience report, which defines resilience in terms of restoring and diversifying natural resources for sustainability, creating responsive institutions grounded in local contexts, and expanding and improving sustainable livelihood options and in terms of gender equality and participatory decision-making. Oxfam (2012, 15) has also defined resilience in terms of ensuring "a safe and just space for humanity to thrive in," where planetary boundaries are not breached and a set of social benchmarks, including access to health care, food, water, energy, education, employment, income, political participation, social equity, and gender equality, is achieved. Activists have also articulated social resilience discourses, including the Transition Towns movement, which seeks to build resilience in the face of climate change, peak oil, and other resource constraints (Hopkins 2008; Welsh 2014) , while the voluntary simplicity and degrowth movements have outlined resilience strategies to reduce dependencies on high levels of consumption (Alexander 2012; Kallis 2011) . However, with the exception of the UN documents, social resilience texts lack formal authority and have attracted only a very low level of attention beyond the academy. Nonetheless, this material is highly relevant, as it articulates a clear and unique resilience discourse in which communities are the primary referents. Social resilience promotes participatory network forms of governance shaped by deliberative rationality and articulates nodal points such as "vulnerability," "human security," "capacity building," "resource dependency," and "transformation." It envisages a postgrowth/postdevelopment transitional pathway that is skeptical of the capacity for technological innovation alone to solve social and environmental problems and instead prioritizes a comprehensive reevaluation of neoliberal economic and development objectives. As such, the fundamental purpose of social resilience is to alleviate human vulnerability through systemic transformation to build the capacity of communities to provide their own security by reducing dependencies on resource extraction, technological fixes, and transnational market structures.
Ecological Resilience
The biotic correlate of human security is ecological security, necessitating the "creation of a condition where the physical surroundings of a community provide for the needs of its inhabitants without diminishing its natural stock" (Rogers 1997, 30) . A standard conceptualization of ecological security seeks to prevent disruption to vital equilibriums, such as those between human populations and the natural resource base, and between different human populations (Pirages 2005) . However, as McDonald (2018, 166; see also Fagan 2017) points out, "notions of 'balance' and 'equilibria' sit uneasily with the contemporary realities of environmental change …, [because] they imply the possibility of a return to a previous (geological) era, while … downplaying the enormity of change and the role of human [s] in creating that change." A more defensible basis of ecological security, therefore, is not maintaining the "stability of individual parts within a system, but rather the system's capacity to spontaneously reorganise itself in response to disturbance and adapt in ways that preserve its identity and function" (Grove and Chandler 2017, 81) . For this reason, McDonald (2018, 166) contends that "ecological security should be oriented less towards the preservation of balance and more towards ecosystem resilience." Similar arguments are made by proponents of "Anthropocene security" (Fagan 2017; Harrington and Shearing 2017) and "posthuman" security (Eroukhmanoff and Harker 2017; Mitchell 2016) .
Shifting the objective of security from merely stabilizing systems to enhancing ecosystem resilience also necessitates a capacity for system transformation. This is reflected in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC; 2012, 563) definition of resilience as the "ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions."
Ecological resilience departs from social resilience by adopting a systemic referent (ecosystems) rather than a discrete referent (communities). While this systemic referent is clearly articulated by key securitizing actors such as the IPCC and the Stockholm Resilience Centre (see, e.g., 2019), these entities possess only a low level of formal authority. With the exception of the periodic IPCC assessment reports, they have also attracted only a low level of attention outside of academia. Some articulations support participatory network forms of governance shaped by a deliberative rationality, while others favor the more administrative/hierarchical approaches implied by notions of "Earth system governance" (Hardt 2018) . Other key nodal points include "ecosystem vulnerability," "ecological security," "planetary boundaries," and "transformation."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ecological resilience also challenges both strategic and neoliberal security frameworks by demonstrating the necessity for collective action, adaptive learning, and deliberative decision-making to meet climate security threats, and the need to build redundancy and diversity into social-ecological systems, and above all, by recognizing the incontrovertible interdependencies between social and ecological systems and the limits to continued economic growth. This underscores the potential for ecological resilience discourses to subvert neoliberal strictures. As Corry (2014, 264) puts it, "while central planning is absolutely compatible with neoliberal governmentality …, the kind of planning justified through reference to resilience is not, precisely because it limits market logics and exposes the state apparatus to critique and disturbance." For instance, although the Stockholm Resilience Centre has been accused by some of being a conduit of neoliberal resilience (see, e.g., Duffield 2011), it actually resists neoliberal nostrums by maintaining that global economic activity must remain within a set of finite "planetary boundaries" (Rockström et al. 2009b; Stockholm Resilience Centre 2019) . In contrast to neoliberalism's avid ecomodernism, this postgrowth perspective prescribes the demarketization of many social and ecological functions and significant state intervention to secure a "safe operating space for humanity" (Rockström et al. 2009a ).
Conclusions
As I have shown in this article, to understand resilience merely, or even primarily, as an extension of neoliberal governmentality is not only analytically overdetermined but also excessively totalizing, because it obscures the socially and ecologically progressive transformational capacity of the discourse (Anderson 2015; Grove and Chandler 2017) . I demonstrated this by comparing the four main discourses of resilience in the climate security debate on the basis of their respective referent objects, securitizing actors, nodal points, forms and rationalities of governance, and prescribed social-ecological-technological transitional pathways. I also evaluated each discourse as to the clarity of its referent object/s, level of formal authority, and degree of institutionalization. These findings are summarized in Table 1 .
As can be seen from the table, strategic resilience fits reasonably comfortably within traditional national security frameworks and constitutes a pragmatic response to new security challenges within existing forms and rationalities of governance. Emanating from the highest levels of the state and achieving a very high degree of institutionalization, strategic resilience articulates a clear and discrete referent object-the nation-state-which is to be protected from climatic risks by means of hierarchical, administrative, technocratic, ecomodernist resilience measures.
Neoliberal resilience shifts the emphasis from national security to preserving the neoliberal socioeconomic system, although this more systemic referent is routinely discursively obscured. As resilience is to be enhanced by inculcating vulnerable states and their citizens to mitigate their vulnerability through participation in market processes, neoliberal resilience adopts a market rationality and an ecomodernist social-ecological-technological transitional pathway. However, despite possessing the formal authority of leading multilateral organizations, neoliberal resilience has not attained anywhere near the same degree of institutionalization as strategic resilience. Nor does it address fundamental causes of vulnerability, and in many respects, it actually exacerbates these by increasing the exposure of vulnerable populations and ecosystems to the vicissitudes of global markets.
Social resilience supports a human security framework that transcends traditional state security strictures and enhances the capacity of communities to alleviate the risks they face through participatory and deliberative forms of governance. By taking communities as its discrete referent, social resilience is attuned to both the systemic production of vulnerability and the need for system transformation in a postgrowth/postdevelopment direction. However, despite clearly articulating all of these elements, social resilience discourse has only achieved a moderate to low level of formal authority and a very low level of institutionalization.
Ecological resilience shifts the referent object from communities to ecosystems to enhance the Earth system's capacity to spontaneously reorganize itself in response to disturbance. This requires containing socioeconomic activity within finite planetary boundaries, necessitating a postgrowth/postdevelopment transitional pathway. Ecological resilience's systemic referent is clearly articulated, albeit from a very low position of formal authority. Nonetheless, largely because of the governmental and media attention given to the IPCC assessment reports, ecological resilience has achieved a slightly higher level of institutionalization than both neoliberal and social resilience. In some articulations, ecological resilience prescribes participatory/deliberative forms of governance, while in others, more hierarchical/administrative notions of Earth system governance are proposed.
Of course, in reality, discourses are more fluid and hybrid than the somewhat rigid categories I have developed in this article. However, this typology does capture the broad range of articulations of resilience across the climate security field, thereby clarifying the various ways in which climate security actors understand threats, risks, and vulnerability; how these factors are both exacerbated and mitigated; and who bears responsibility for causing and alleviating climate insecurities. In doing so, a deeper understanding of how dominant climate security narratives shape contemporary global environmental politics has been made possible.
Nonetheless, questions remain as to the capacity of resilience to shape efficacious human and ecological security strategies, because, even in their social and ecological articulations, most resilience discourses fail to articulate exactly for whom resilience is sought and how this is to be achieved in practice (Boas and Rothe 2016; Brown 2013; Zebrowski 2016) . Answering these crucial questions, therefore, requires an examination of the ways that "actually existing resilience" practices have shaped climate security outcomes for the world's most vulnerable communities and ecosystems, and how these might be improved to reduce fundamental vulnerabilities. This might involve ethnographic observation of, and in-depth interviews with, resilience practitioners and members of those communities in which resilience measures have been implemented. Subjecting resilience programs to systematic policy evaluations and the development of metrics to measure different kinds of resilience would also increase the likelihood that climate security strategies actually address fundamental insecurities and vulnerabilities.
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